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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between public disclosure, private information and stock 
liquidity in Tunisian context using a sample of 41 listed firms in the Tunis Stock Exchange in 
2007. First, we find no evidence that there is a relation between public and private 
information. Second, Tunisian investors do not trust the information disclosed in both annual 
reports and web sites, consequently it has no effects on stock liquidity, in contrast with private 
information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is commonly known that asymmetric information problems lead to agency conflicts 
between managers and outside investors, which decrease both the volume and number of 
transactions in capital market (Akerlof, 1970). Voluntary disclosure of information has double 
role. First, it is a way to mitigate information asymmetry and consequently agency conflicts; 
investors use disclosed information to choose profitable projects. Second, even when the 
project is carried out, information disclosure deters also managers from opportunistic 
behavior. For example, they cannot take excessive risky decisions to expropriate investors’ 
wealth (Bushman and Smith, 2003). Moreover, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that disclosure 
reduces agency costs and even the cost of outside financing (the pecking order theory). Since, 
“good” managers will be encouraged to disclose more voluntary information, which is, in 
turn, considered as a good signal of the quality of corporate governance (Chen et al., 2007).  
In the last years, corporate information disclosure has received considerable attention: 
many empirical studies argue that voluntarily disclosure in developed markets which are 
strongly regulated reduces capital cost3 and improves stock liquidity4. However, in emerging 
markets, empirical studies are divided and their results are not conclusive: Hassan et al. 
(2009), Wang et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) show that there is no significant effect of 
information disclosure neither on firm’s value nor on financing cost (debt and equity). Gana 
and Chemli (2008) find that stock liquidity decreases with the level of information disclosure. 
However, Mattoussi et al. (2004) and Haddad et al. (2009) find a positive relationship 
between stock liquidity and disclosure level. Notice that the main source of information in 
these studies is the information publicly and voluntarily disclosed in annual reports. However, 
the firm’s information environment consists of public information (disclosed in annual 
reports, web sites and conference calls) and private information disseminated through 
informed trading. Financial literature on information disclosure argues that public and private 
information are substitutes (Verrecchia, 1982 and Diamond, 1985) or complement (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1991 and McNichols and Trueman, 1994). 
In this paper, we raise the question: what is the impact of the informational 
environment on stock liquidity in the Tunisian market?  
                                                 
3
 See among others, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Hail (2002). 
 
4
 See among others Welker (1995), Heflin et al.( 2005 and 2007) Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Chen et al. (2007). 
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To answer this question, we examine how Tunisian investors make investment 
decisions and if there is a relationship between public and private information. In contrast 
with Mattousi et al. (2004) and Gana and Chemli (2008) who were interested only in public 
information disclosed in annual reports, we consider both public information (in annual 
reports and web sites) and private information (order flows). 
In Tunisia, the law No 94-117 has fixed mandatory information, the conditions and the 
timing of disclosure. In addition, the Financial Market Council (Conseil des Marchés 
Financiers, CMF) set some rules about the kind of information that should be disclosed in 
annual reports. In 2008, CMF reformed presented a detailed reference model of annual 
reports. However, it does not supervise the content of annual reports and does not impose 
punishment if firms did not publish mandatory information. Consequently, Tunisian firms are 
not constrained to disclose more information. Fitch Ratings (2009) argues that Tunisian 
market is poorly regulated and has transparency problems. During the period 2006-2009, 
Tunisian market was assigned a disclosure index equal to 0 by the Doing Business reports5. 
 The current study has three main results. First, we find no relationship between public 
and private information. This finding implies that public information does not reduce adverse 
selection problems as signaling theory predicts. Second, in contrast with prior Tunisian 
studies (Mattoussi and al., 2004; Gana and Chemli, 2008), we find that voluntary information 
disclosure in annual reports and on websites has no significant effect on stock liquidity. Our 
results show that information disclosure does not solve information asymmetry and that 
Tunisian investors do not rely on it to make their investment decisions. Third, it seems that 
Tunisian investors are overconfident: they rely only on their private information even when 
there is an arrival of new flow of public information. They did not update their beliefs and 
traded aggressively (Daniel et al., 1998) which may decrease stock liquidity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and provides hypothesis. The sample and the methodology are presented in Section 3. Results 
are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we test the robustness of our results. We conclude in 
Section 6. 
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The extent of disclosure index is yearly index provided by Doing Business. It varies between 0 and 10, with higher values reflecting greater disclosure. This index includes 5 components: 
1)What corporate body provides legally sufficient approval for the transaction; 2) Immediate disclosure to the public and/or shareholders;3) Disclosures in published periodic filings; 4) 
Disclosures by controlling shareholder  to board of directors; 5) Requirement that an external body review the transaction before it takes place.
 
 
 5
2. Survey of the literature 
Adverse selection models (see among other Bagehot, 1971; Kyle 1985 and Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985) are based on the assumption that market makers establish a large spread 
to minimize potential losses due to informed trading and simultaneously to maximize 
potential gains due to uninformed trading. Hence, adverse selection risk induces a high cost of 
transaction. Even without market makers, as in order-driven market, it is shown that adverse 
selection problems have effects on trading process and stock liquidity. Handa and Schwartz 
(1996) show that liquidity suppliers, who can be considered as market makers, prefer doing 
few orders to compensate the losses of informed trading with the gains of uninformed trading. 
Later, Handa et al. (2003) find that high spread is explained by adverse selection problems. In 
order to diminish information asymmetry, traders prefer public information rather than private 
information: collecting private information is too costly. This is supposed to improve the 
market conditions: homogenize investors’ opinions and reduce speculative positions 
(Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985). More information disclosure is supposed to reduce 
asymmetric information which reduces transactions costs and improves stock liquidity 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, and Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Furthermore, Brown 
and Hillegeist (2007) point out that information disclosure improves the firm’s image in its 
market. In contrast with traders, investors rely on private information particularly when they 
are expecting future public disclosures in pre-announcement period. So, public disclosures 
may make asymmetric information problems more severe (Kim and Verrecchia 1991; 
McNichols and Trueman, 1994). 
Notice that most of the previous studies were conducted in developed markets, 
particularly in the American market. They show that improving disclosure leads to a decrease 
of the spread (Welker, 1995; Healy et al. 1999; Heflin et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007) and 
consequently the compensation of market makers. In such conditions, they noticed that many 
market makers leave their job because of the low quoted depth (Heflin et al., 2005). These 
results are also consistent with those of Brown and Hillegeist (2007), who find that the 
disclosure’s quality is negatively related to the level of information asymmetry. In other stock 
markets, Madrid stock exchange for example, Espinosa et al. (2008) join previous papers and 
highlight the positive relation between stock liquidity and disclosure level. In contrast, in 
Jordanian stock market, Haddad et al. (2009) find a negative relation between spread and 
disclosure level, but lower than in developed countries. Mattoussi et al. (2004) test the 
relationship between disclosure level and stock liquidity using a Tunisian data in 2001. Their 
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results show that high level of disclosure diminishes quoted spread and increases quoted 
depth. Later, Gana and Chemli (2008) study the impact of disclosure level on spread using a 
sample of listed firms in the period 2001-2004. In contrast with Mattousi et al., they show a 
positive and significant effect of voluntary disclosure on spread. One explanation is that 
Tunisian investors have no confidence on the disclosed information in annual reports and do 
not use it to make their decisions.  
Thus, private information can increase adverse selection problems and lead 
consequently to a decrease of stock liquidity. In contrast, public/voluntary information 
disclosure may solve adverse selection problems and discourage collecting private 
information and improves stock liquidity. Based on these findings, we state two hypotheses: 
H1: Under asymmetric information, private information has negative effect on stock 
liquidity. 
H2: The more public information is disclosed, the more stock liquidity will increase. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
 
First, we consider common stocks of firms listed in the Tunisian Stock Exchange in 
2007. The initial sample contains 50 firms in both financial and non-financial sectors. Second, 
we eliminate stocks recently introduced in 2007 and non common ordinary stocks. Third, we 
exclude firms missing annual reports. Hence, 41 firms remain in our sample. Annual reports 
of these firms were provided by the CMF and brokerage firms. In order to examine disclosure 
on websites, data were gathered from firms’ websites. For other variables, the data about daily 
trading (like for example price, trading volume, best ask and best bid) are provided by the 
Tunisian Stock Exchange.  
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Table 1. Sample composition 
Initial sample  
Shares listed in 2007 50 
New listed shares 2 
Non common ordinary shares 2 
 
46 
Shares by industry  
Banks 10 
Other financial firms 11 
Services 7 
Manufacturing firms 18 
 
 
Annual reports not available 5 
Final sample 41 
 
3.2. Liquidity measure 
In contrast with prior empirical studies using one-dimensional liquidity measures such 
as spread or depth (Mattoussi et al. 2004; Gana and Chemli, 2008), we choose a 
multidimensional measure: the turnover-adjusted number of non trading days. According to 
Liu (2006), this measure captures three dimensions of liquidity: potential delay for executing 
an order, the cost and the quantity of transaction. The Liu’s measure is the standardized 
turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes which is supposed to be more 
appropriate to assess liquidity risk than average spread and illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002) 
when the sample includes shares with high trading activity and shares with low trading 
activity. Indeed, the average spread and Amihud’s ratio cannot be calculated in non trading 
days, while Liu’measure includes the effect of non trading on liquidity risk. 
NoTDDeflator
TURNNoZVLIUM 2521 ×





+=  
where NoZR is the number of zero-volume trading days and NoTD is the total number of 
trading days in the market over the year. Because this number can vary from one year to 
another, the factor 
NoTD
252 is used to standardize it to 252 days (average number of trading days 
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in one year) to make this measure comparable over time; Deflator6 is chosen arbitrary for all 
stocks, such that: 
    1/10 <<
Deflator
TURN
 
 
3.3. Voluntarily information disclosure level 
In order to measure the level of information disclosure, previous studies advance that 
annual reports are more “informative” than short-term reports and other sources of 
information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan 1997). However, these studies were 
conducted in developed economies and consequently cannot be automatically generalized to 
emerging economies. Moreover, in addition to annual reports, we consider another source of 
information: firms’ websites. To our knowledge there is no empirical study analyzing the link 
between stock liquidity and public information disclosed in websites in emerging and 
developed markets. For this reason, we construct two indexes to measure public information 
disclosed in annual reports and in web sites. 
In prior studies7 on voluntary disclosure, two categories of disclosure index were used. First, 
the indexes constructed by specialized agencies, like indexes of Corporate Information 
Committee of the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF), the Association of Investment 
Management and Research Corporation Information Committee (AIMR) and Standard & 
Poor's (S&P). They contain all the information provided by firms: annual, half-yearly, 
quarterly and other written information and information about investors’ relations. However, 
these agencies are dealing only with large firms. Second, the indexes constructed by studies 
such as indexes of Botosan (1997) Eng and Mak (2003) and Wang et al. (2008) to measure 
the level of disclosure only in annual reports. These indexes depend significantly on 
subjective criteria, for example the author’s approach (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Because 
of the absence of such agencies in Tunisia, we considered extensions of these indexes more 
appropriate to measure information disclosure in annual reports and in websites. 
 
Disclosure level in annual reports (BOTS) 
The first index we consider is an extension of Botosan index (Botosan, 1997) and measures 
the volume of public information in annual reports. It captures five types of information: (1) 
background information like for example management’s objectives, business strategy and 
                                                 
6
 We use a deflator of 3500 000 in constructing LIUM 
7
 See among others Chen et al. (2007), Botosan (1997) and Eng and Mak (2003) 
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principal products; (2) historical summaries of annual financial results; (3) non-financial 
information such as market share and average compensation per employee; (4) forecasted 
information such as forecast of profits and cash-flows, and (5) management discussion and 
analysis about yearly changes that are not contained in financial statements. This index, 
initially constructed for non financial American firms, was adapted by Mattoussi et al. (2004) 
in financial sector. In this paper, we readjusted this index according to the CMF regulation.  
To construct this index, first, we fix preliminary information items which may be 
disclosed in a voluntarily way. Botosan (1997) choose items according to the 
recommendations of the Jenkins report (AICPA, 1995). The Botosan’ scoring procedure 
consists on assigning one point for qualitative information and one additional point for 
quantitative information. The score is the total points given to the firm divided by the highest 
score. Many researchers construct their own indexes based upon this index for different 
institutional setting, such as: Gul and Leung (2004) for Hong Kong listed firms; Patelli and 
Prencipe (2007) for Italians firms; Alsaeed (2006) for Saudi firms, Mattoussi et al. (2004) and 
Gana and Chemli (2008) for Tunisian firms. 
Second, we adapt these items to Tunisian firms. We compare preliminary items with 
required elements according to the CMF. We take the example of information about historical 
financial results: Tunisians firm must provide some statistics about performance variations 
during the past 5 years. Thus, information disclosed for a period longer than 5 years is called 
voluntary information. However, indexes used in previous studies set the threshold of 2 years 
(Mattoussi et al., 2004; Gana and Chemli, 2008). 
Third, we adjust our index to the practices in Tunisian firms. We apply items list to 
annual reports to exclude irrelevant items, such as: 1) not disclosed by any firm and 2) 
disclosed by all firms. Our final index includes 36 items which contain general information 
(12 items); summary of historical financial results (3 items), non-financial information (5 
items), forecasting information (7 items) and analysis and discussion of the management (9 
items).  
The final step is to test the reliability of this constructed index. For this we use 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha that is commonly used to assess the internal consistency.  
Cronbach’s coefficient indicates that the disclosure index shows satisfying internal 
consistency (Cronbach Alpha = 0,650). 
 
 
 
 10
 
 
 Disclosure level in firm’ websites (SWEB) 
 
We construct another index to evaluate the level of information contained in firms’ websites.  
 Disclosure level (the volume and the quality of information) in websites is difficult to assess 
since it cannot be measured directly (Cooke and Wallace, 1989). Using Internet to disclose 
information has become a common practice in many companies. It is a way among others to 
reduce disclosure’s costs (Healy and Palepu, 2001). It provides valuable information to 
investors who would like to invest in the firm. The corporate governance’s principles of the 
OECD (2004) and the guide of good governance practices in Tunisian companies edited in 
2008 encourage the use of Internet. We scrutinize websites to identify the main information, 
which is supposed to be helpful in making decision process. We retain six kinds of 
information: financial information not included in annual reports, availability of 
downloadable annual reports, availability of downloadable annual reports of previous years, 
access to press releases; access to press articles such as interviews with CEO (some press 
articles are downloadable) and availability of corporate governance data. This helps us to 
assign an index to each website.   
 
Table 2. Frequency of items identified in Tunisian firms’ site web 
 Frequency Percentage 
Existence of a website 31 67% 
Financial information 9 19% 
Availability of annual report 10 22% 
Availability of annual reports of previous years 5 11% 
Access to press releases 6 13% 
Access press articles 2 43% 
Availability of governance data  6 13% 
 
Only 67% of our firms have web sites, such as Amen bank, ASSAD, BIAT and 
TUNISAIR. We observe that websites contain annual report of the current year and some 
additional financial information and press articles. We state that information addressed to 
investors and the firms’ shareholders is fewer than information addressed to customers and 
suppliers. Scoring procedure is to assign one point for each available item. The web index is 
the sum of points divided by the highest index (7 points). The test of reliability reveal a good 
internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha = 0,738). 
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3.4. Private information production 
 
We use the percentage of informed trading as a measure of private information 
production, the average absolute value of imbalance order (AIMO). Easley et al. (1996) argue 
that uninformed investors submit buying and selling orders with equal probabilities. However, 
informed ones submit more purchase orders if they receive positive information signal and 
more sales orders if they receive negative information signal. Therefore, the difference 
between the two kinds of orders measures the information asymmetry. Hmaied et al. (2006) 
find that Tunisian investors have different behavior. In fact, in contrast with sellers who use 
only public information, buyers use private information to decide. Thus, they conclude that 
buyers submit more orders than sellers. According to Aktas et al. (2007), the probability of 
informed trading AIMO can be measured by: 
( ) ( )QSQBQSQBAIMO +−=
 
where QB and QS represent respectively orders quantity of ask  and bid. 
3.5. Control variables   
 
In the current study, we retain the following control variables: volatility (VLAT), firm size 
(SIZE) and the book to market (BTMK). To measure stock return volatility, we use the 
standard deviation of daily returns. It captures total risk of stocks. Most of the studies8 find 
that stocks with high volatility are riskier and consequently less liquid. In contrast, Kyle 
(1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) advance that volatility is positively associated with 
stock liquidity. Indeed, informed traders attempt to hide their trading among transactions of 
liquidity traders’ transactions, which induces high volatility and high liquidity. Hence, an 
increase of volatility increases the liquidity in the market.   
Merton (1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that the firm 
size, defined by logarithm of the firm’s capitalization, increases with stock market liquidity.    
According to Fama and French (1993), book to market ratio captures the firm’s risk, and 
investors ask for high premium to compensate them for the risk of holding their stocks. This is 
                                                 
8
 See among others, Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981) 
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why, we include book to market ratio in order to control the effect of firm risk on stock 
liquidity. 
 
Table 3. Definition of variables 
Variables Abbreviations Indicators Expected 
signs 
Liquidity LIUM The standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily 
trading volumes 
 
Characteristics 
of information 
environment 
BOTS Botosan index modified (+) 
SWEB Siteweb index (+) 
AIMO The average absolute value of imbalance order (-) 
Control 
variables 
SIZE Market value of  equity (+) 
BTMK A ratio of the book value of a assets to its market value (-) 
VLAT Standard deviation of the daily stock returns (-) 
 
4. Empirical findings and discussions  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The table 4 presents descriptive statistics. The Panel A shows that potential delay in 
executing an order is on average 56 days. There is a big deviation for this variable (67 days), 
which implies that our sample includes high and low frequently traded stocks. In addition, we 
notice that the parameter of the firm’s size is on average 129 millions (Ms) of TND9, which 
varies between 6 Ms TND and 784 Ms TND. One explanation of the high dispersion of the 
firm’s size is that our sample contains 10 of the largest firms10 (66% of market share).  
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
A. descriptive statistics of liquidity and other stock characteristics 
 LIUM BTMK 
 
SIZE 
(MD) 
VLAT 
N 46 46 46 46 
Mean 56.791 0.800 129 0.032 
Median 26.313 0.815 52 0.015 
Std. Deviation 68.987 0.292 174 0.046 
Skewness 1.477 0.720 2.323 2.741 
Kurtosis 1.266 2.680 5.761 7.445 
Minimum 0.001 0.256 6 0.005 
Maximum 243.067 1.800 784 0.223 
                                                 
9
 1TND≈0,69665 USD 
10
 These firms are SFBT, Tunisair, BT, BIAT, BH, UBCI, ATB, STB, Attijari Bank and Amen Bank 
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Legend: 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market capitalisation; VLAT=standard deviation 
daily returns; LIUM= standardised turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volume; 
 
B. Descriptive statistics of information environment 
  IGEN HIST INFI PREV GEST BOTS SWEB AIMO 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 46 46 
Mean 0.089 0.004 0.038 0.026 0.079 0.222 0.211 46.342 
Median 0.080 0.000 0.043 0.022 0.087 0.217 0.143 40.073 
Standard deviation 0.027 0.011 0.023 0.029 0.032 0.058 0.225 18.562 
Skewness 1.486 2.951 -0.310 0.880 -0.361 0.391 1.150 14.48 
Kurtosis 2.119 8.052 -0.532 -0.089 -0.510 0.303 0.684 15.07 
Minimum 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.000 25.158 
Maximum 0.174 0.043 0.087 0.109 0.130 0.348 0.857 99.998 
Legend  
IGEN= General information; HIST= summary historical financial results; INFI= non financial information; PREV=forecasting information; 
MANG= analysis and discussion of the management; BOTS= disclosure index of annual reports; SWEB =website disclosure index; AIMO= 
absolute value of imbalance order. 
 
  The average stock return volatility is high (3%) and it varies between 22,3% and 
0,5%. The ratio of book to market is on average 80%, which implies that stocks are 
overvalued. Statistics indicates that the average percentage of informed trading, which 
captures private information, is high (46%) and may reach a maximum level of 99%. The 
average disclosure index of annual reports is 22,2%, and varies between 10,3% and 34,8%. Its 
average deviation is 5,8%. This means that the level of information disclosure does not vary 
significantly among Tunisian firms. They prefer disclosing more information about 
management objectives, business strategy and the change of management activity, and some 
financial and forecasting information. The disclosure index on web sites is on average 21,1% 
and its deviation is 22,5%, which suggests that the content of websites varies significantly 
from one firm to another: (1) 15 firms have no sites, (2) 14 firms use websites as customer 
interface and do not disclose any information to investors11, and (3) 17 firms disclose useful 
information for investors. 
 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
Table 5 reports that liquidity does not depend on voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
and in websites. In contrast, the percentage of informed trading is positively correlated with 
                                                 
11
 Tunisair, SIAME, Elmazraa and UBCI. 
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the timing of executing an order. This implies that stock liquidity is decreasing with private 
information. The information environment proxies (disclosure index on annual reports, 
disclosure index on websites and imbalance order) are not correlated between them, which is 
not consistent with the assumption that private and public information are not related.  
 
 
Table 5. Spearman's correlation between informational environment of firms and control variables 
  BOTS SWEB AIMO LIUM BTMK VLAT SIZE 
BOTS 1,000       
SWEB 0.071 1,000      
AIMO 0.029 -0.022 1,000     
LIUM -0.077 -0.226 0.829** 1,000    
BTMK -0.127 0.163 -0.013 -0.056 1,000   
VLAT -0.079 0.043 -0.201 -0.162 0.013 1,000  
SIZE   0.071      0.421** -0.264  -0.406** -0.271 -0.176 1,000 
Legend: 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation daily returns; LIUM= standardized turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volume; BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on website; AIMO=absolute 
value of imbalance order.*. **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
In fact, the policy of Tunisian firms in terms of corporate information disclosure does 
not add valuable and reliable information to investors; consequently, they do not rely on such 
information to make decisions. One explanation is that usually Tunisian investors did not rely 
on disclosed information: they prefer traditional ways to collect the information they need. 
Indeed, Dellagi et al. (2001) advance that Tunisians invest based on information provided by 
friends and relatives. Some of them are suspicious and do not trust these reports. We notice a 
positive correlation between web sites disclosure and the firm’s size. This result shows that 
only the largest firms, particularly banks, disclose information through their websites. 
 
4.3. Regression analysis 
 
Hereafter, we test the following model to study the relation between stock liquidity 
and the variables presented above: 
iiiiiiii SIZEBTMKVLATSWEBBOTSAIMOLIUM εδδδδδδδ +++++++= 6543210
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Table 6. Relationship between firms’ information environment and stock liquidity 
              LIUM 
AIMO 3.296 
  
(6.73)** 
BOTS -89.922 
  
(0.98) 
SWEB -39.697 
  
(1.92) 
VLAT 1.296 
  
(0.24) 
SIZE -2.430 
  
(0.55) 
BTMK 28.667 
  
(1.39) 
Constant -40.623 
  
(0.44) 
Observations 41 
Adjusted R2  0.79 
Legend 
BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on website; 
AIMO=absolute value of imbalance order; BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market 
capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation daily returns. 
*, **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
The model’s estimation leads the validation of H1 and the rejection of H2. Indeed, we 
report a positive effect of percentage of informed trading on Liu measure. Then we conclude 
that private information increases adverse selection risk which reduces stock liquidity. In 
addition, we show that the level of information disclosure, measured by Botosan index has no 
effect on liquidity. This result is consistent with Hassan et al. (2009), who find no effect of 
voluntary information disclosure on Egyptian firms’ value.  
However, our study provides different results from Gana and Chemli (2008) and 
Mattoussi et al. (2004). For instance, Mattoussi et al. study demonstrates that information 
voluntarily disclosed in annual reports reduces information asymmetry and improves stock 
liquidity, in contrast with Gana and Chemli find the opposite effect. One explanation of their 
different findings is the use of different research method. They examine different periods 
using dynamic and static approaches. In contrast with indexes they used, we constructed a 
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new index more appropriate to the Tunisian framework. Indeed, we have excluded from the 
Botosan index used by Mattoussi et al. (2004) and Gana and Chemli (2008) some items that 
are considered as mandatory items according CMF regulation. Hence, the significant effect of 
disclosure level on stock liquidity found in previous studies may be explained by mandatory 
elements contained in their indexes. Therefore, the voluntary disclosed information is not too 
useful and valuable for the Tunisian investors to make their decisions. Firms disclose 
information only for respecting the regulation and still limited.  
Indeed, the disclosed information in annual reports is too standard in the sense that all 
the Tunisian firms provide the same information. 
Our results show that there is no valuable information disclosed in web sites. 
Accordingly, websites’ information is not considered a reliable information for Tunisian 
investors. We conclude that voluntary disclosure does not mitigate information asymmetry. 
Indeed, in Tunisia as in other Arabic countries (for example Egypt and Jordan), firms do not 
disclose enough information to investors because of social and cultural characteristics, such as 
tendency towards secrecy (Hassan et al. 2006; Haddad et al., 2009). For instance, investors do 
not rely on the firm to obtain useful information they need but prefer paying to collect private 
information. Consequently, adverse selection risk increases significantly and discourages 
liquidity traders to negotiate, which decreases stock liquidity. Moreover, we can explain the 
decisions of Tunisian investors by psychological biases. According to Daniel et al. (1998), 
investors’ overconfidence bias leads to overreaction in the market. Hence, investors’ response 
to public information is limited. The adjustment of investors’ decision is too little even if 
public information contradicts their private information.  
Indeed, the survey of Zaiane and Abaoub (2010) confirms that Tunisian investors are 
overconfident. They find that 66,4% of respondents have confidence in their intuitions while 
32,4% of respondents hold their stocks less than three months. Consequently, overconfident 
investors trade aggressively. Their results show that 55,2% of respondents use more than one 
source of information (Internet, newspapers and advice of brokers) because they think that 
they will never get all the hidden information. Hence, they conclude that Tunisian investors 
overestimate the quality of information and their ability to interpret it. 
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5.4. Robustness tests 
 
5.4.1. Bootstrap approach 
In small samples, a bootstrap approach might be preferred. This approach consists to 
simulate new samples obtained by sampling with replacement from the original sample. 
Results given by this approach are the same found with OLS regression. Hence, we confirm 
the robustness of previous results. 
Table 7. Relationship between firms’ information environment and stock liquidity using Bootstrap 
approch 
 
              LIUM 
AIMO 3.296 
  (7.62)** 
BOTS -89.922 
  (1.05) 
SWEB -39.697 
  (1.59) 
VLAT 1.296 
  (0.19) 
SIZE -2.430 
  (0.58) 
BTMK 28.667 
  (1.17) 
Constant -40.623 
  (0.52) 
Observations  41 
Adjusted R2  0.7548 
Legend 
BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on 
website; AIMO=absolute value of imbalance order; BTMK=book-to-
market ratio; SIZE= market capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation 
daily returns. 
*, **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
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5.4.2. Other liquidity proxies 
To check for robustness of results, we replace the Liu’s measure with other liquidity 
measures. We test whether the previous results depend on the choice of liquidity measures or 
not. We have two sets of measures capturing two liquidity dimensions: cost and quantity. For 
assessing the cost of transaction, we rely on 1) bid ask spread (BASQ) frequently used in prior 
studies12 as a measure of immediat cost; 2) Amihud illiquidity ratio (ILIQ) which captures the 
price impact13 ; and 3) the proportion of zero returns (PZER) which represents  the total cost 
of transaction14. In order to measure the transaction volume, we introduce two measures: 1) 
turnover ratio (TURN) reflecting trading frequency; and 2) market depth15 (DEPH) employed 
as a measure of transaction volume. The following table provides results.  
 
Table 8. Relationship between firms’ information environment and other liquidity proxies 
 BASQ PZER ILIQ DEPH TURN 
AIMO 0.021 1.115 0.057 -0.019 -0.064 
 
(2.02) (8.43)** (4.17)** (3.85)** (3.82)** 
BOTS -3.441 -42.930 0.666 4.271 0.291 
 
(1.50) (1.25) (0.19) (3.26)** (0.08) 
SWEB -0.589 -11.544 -0.336 0.232 0.951 
 
(1.50) (1.19) (0.52) (0.63) (1.18) 
VLAT -0.032 -0.371 0.289 0.208 -0.129 
 
(0.29) (0.14) (1.48) (2.08)* (0.59) 
SIZE -0.208 -0.314 -0.699 0.016 -0.378 
 
(2.41)* (0.16) (5.57)** (0.22) (2.62)* 
BTMK 0.403 14.070 1.034 0.897 -1.507 
 
(0.70) (1.89) (1.52) (3.18)** (1.70) 
Constant 3.918 -2.928 11.805 5.909 6.745 
 (1.87) (0.07) (4.66)** (3.95)** (2.22)* 
Observations 41 41 41 41 41 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.75 0.71 0.60 0.47 
Legend 
BTMK=book-to-market ratio; SIZE= market capitalization; VLAT=standard deviation daily returns; LIUM= standardised turnover-
adjusted number of zero daily trading volume; BOTS= disclosure index on annual reports; SWEB= disclosure index on website; 
AIMO=absolute value of imbalance order. 
*, **: statistically significant for the threshold values of 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
                                                 
12
 Mattoussi et al. (2004); Gana and Chemli (2008) and Haddad et al. (2009). 
13
 Espinosa et al. (2008). 
14
 Lesmond et al. (1999). 
15
 Mattoussi et al. (2004). 
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Results show that voluntary information disclosure has no effect on transaction cost. 
Hence, corporate disclosure does not mitigate asymmetric information problems and is not 
enough to improve stock liquidity. In contrast, we detect positive and significant effect of 
private information on the measures of transaction costs. One explanation is that when there is 
an arrival of large number of informed investors into the market, information asymmetry is 
more severe, consequently transaction costs increase. These results show the robustness of 
those found using Liu’s measure. Moreover, private information reduces the frequency of 
activity and market depth. In addition, we report that public information published in annual 
reports improves the market depth. This indicates that information voluntarily disclosed 
(BOTS) improves the absorption of shares without affecting both frequency and cost of 
transaction. These results confirm also, that the Tunisian investors do not rely on public 
information to measure transaction costs.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we raised the question of the effect of informational environment of the 
firm on stock liquidity in Tunisian market, which contains public and private information. Our 
results show that there is no relationship between private and public information. We find also 
that only private information influences stock liquidity, and that Tunisian investors do not rely 
only on information disclosed in annual reports and firms’ websites. Contrary to previous 
empirical findings in emerging market (Mattoussi et al. 2004; Haddad et al., 2009), our study 
does not support the signaling theory predictions but confirms the predictions of behavioral 
finance theory. These results may help also to understand the informational environment of 
Tunisian listed firms. Despite the Tunisian regulation’s efforts made to improve the firms’ 
transparency, this is not enough to constrain Tunisian firms to disclose more useful 
information and to discourage private information collection. 
 In fact, Tunisian regulators need to incite Tunisian listed companies to disclose more 
information through fiscal advantages and subventions. In addition, CMF should control the 
information disseminated and impose penalties when firms did not disclose mandatory 
information (other than financial statement) in annual report.  
Our study presents some limitations. First, we consider a static approach since we 
consider only firms listed in 2007. Second, we have neglected other sources of information, 
such as meetings with financial analysts and media representatives. Indeed, this practice has 
been increasingly adopted by the Tunisian firms as a mean of voluntary disclosure, 
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particularly following the outbreak of the global financial crisis. In 2008, 20 listed companies 
held 31 meetings with analysts, 17 of which were held during the market downturn because of 
the financial crisis16. Some companies have had more than one meeting in 2008, for example, 
Alkimia has organized 4 meetings. Thus, it would be interesting to see the effect of such new 
ways of communication on the behavior of Tunisian investors. 
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